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From Principles to Rules: The Case for 
Statutory Rules Governing Aspects of 
Judicial Disqualification
JULA HUGHES AND PHILIP BRYDEN*
The common law “reasonable apprehension of bias” test for judicial disqualification is highly 
fact- and context-specific. While there are good reasons for this approach as a general 
proposition, it also gives rise to considerable uncertainty for both judges and litigants in 
considering whether or not it is appropriate for a judge to sit in a marginal case. This article 
explores statutory judicial disqualification regimes in the United States, Germany, and Quebec 
to gain insights into how statutory rules can be employed to provide greater clarity to judges 
and litigants who are addressing situations that have the potential to give rise to judicial 
disqualification. Using these insights, the authors then propose the use of statutory rules 
to address problem areas with respect to professional relationships with former colleagues 
and clients, prior judicial involvement with litigants, extrajudicial writings, and procedures 
for making determinations concerning judicial disqualification.
L’épreuve de « crainte raisonnable de partialité » prévue par la common law pour nécessiter 
à un magistrat de se récuser repose fortement sur les faits et le contexte. Bien que cette 
approche soit généralement bien fondée, elle suscite tant chez les juges que chez les 
plaideurs une grande incertitude quand vient le temps de déterminer si un juge est habilité à 
siéger dans un cas douteux. Cet article examine le régime d’incapacité judiciaire prévu par la 
loi aux États-Unis, en Allemagne et au Québec afin de mieux comprendre comment les règles 
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prévues par la loi peuvent clarifier tant au bénéfice des juges que des plaideurs les situations 
susceptibles d’entraîner une incapacité judiciaire. À partir de cela, les auteurs proposent le 
recours aux règles prévues par la loi pour résoudre les problèmes que pourraient entraîner 
des relations professionnelles avec d’anciens collègues ou clients, une implication juridique 
préalable avec les plaideurs, des écrits extrajudiciaires et les procédures susceptibles 
d’entraîner une incapacité judiciaire.
COURTS IN SEVERAL COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS have adopted one variation 
or another of a highly fact-driven and contextual “reasonable apprehension of 
bias” test for judicial disqualification. For example, the English Court of Appeal 
in the Locabail decision emphasized that “every application must be decided on 
the facts and circumstances of the individual case.”1 Similarly, the Privy Council 
has asserted in a New Zealand case that “[t]his is a corner of the law in which 
the context, and the particular circumstances, are of supreme importance.”2 The 
Supreme Court of Canada, drawing on these decisions, concluded in Wewaykum 
that “[a]s a result, it cannot be addressed through peremptory rules, and contrary 
to what was submitted during oral argument, there are no ‘textbook’ instances.”3
Despite this assertion by Canada’s highest court, we argue in this article that 
statutory rules have a useful role to play in the law of judicial disqualification. 
1. Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd, [1999] EWCA Civ 3004, [2000] QB 
451 at para 480.
2. Man O’War Station Ltd v Auckland City Council (Judgment No 1), [2002] UKPC 28 at para 
11, [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (PC).
3. Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para 77, [2003] 2 SCR 
259 [Wewaykum].
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To advance this argument, we draw on the results of a study of the experiences 
and attitudes of Canadian provincial and territorial judges concerning recusal 
and disqualification4 to identify some of the difficulties judges experience in 
applying the fact-sensitive “reasonable apprehension of bias” test in marginal 
cases and some of the reasons for these difficulties. We then consider experiences 
in two countries, the United States and Germany, that have to a significant extent 
codified judicial disqualification. Further, we discuss the experience with statutory 
provisions governing judicial disqualification in the province of Quebec in 
particular. While these codifications typically include a general requirement that 
judges not sit on cases where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned,5 
they often supplement these general provisions with more detailed rules governing 
disqualification based on certain facts that might give rise to a concern about 
impartiality. Of equal importance, they often contain rules identifying situations 
that do not, without more, result in a judge’s disqualification.
In each of the comparator jurisdictions, we situate recusal rules within a broader 
constitutional and cultural context related to the role of the judiciary, though 
we limit the scope of the analysis to areas that might be helpful in considering 
specific recommendations for adaptation to the Canadian context outside of 
Quebec. We give an overview of the enumerated grounds of disqualification 
and consider the relationship between general grounds of disqualification and 
enumerated grounds. In short, in Germany and the United States, the enumerated 
grounds are grounds for automatic disqualification. In Quebec, only one of the 
enumerated grounds is a basis for automatic disqualification, though the other 
codified grounds will usually be sufficient to require disqualification despite the 
permissive statutory language. Lastly, we describe the procedural regime in each 
jurisdiction, with particular focus on the question of who decides recusal motions.
We suggest that there are at least three substantive areas where a rule-based 
approach to high-frequency bias issues is helpful: professional relationships 
between justice personnel and litigation participants; prior judicial consideration 
in a case or in related litigation; and extrajudicial writings suggesting a 
4. Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, “The Tip of the Iceberg: A Survey of the Philosophy and 
Practice of Canadian Provincial and Territorial Judges Concerning Judicial Disqualification” 
(2011) 48 Alta L Rev 569 [Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg”].
5. See e.g. 28 USC § 455(a). It reads, “Any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.” See also Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1). The rules state, “A judge 
must recuse in any proceeding in which: (1) the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.”
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predisposition. Additionally, and importantly, we suggest that procedural rules 
regarding recusal motions should be made explicit.6
I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING 
THE “REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS” TEST
The empirical data for this article are drawn from our earlier study (conducted 
with the assistance of the Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges) of 
Canadian provincial and territorial court judges’ attitudes toward and experiences 
with recusal and disqualification. We surveyed 137 provincial and territorial 
judges. Our survey respondents included provincial court judges from each of 
the ten Canadian provinces and three territorial judges. The survey was in two 
parts. The first part of the survey asked questions about the type of jurisdiction 
the judges exercised, their personal experience with recusal, and their general 
expectations with respect to recusal in their jurisdiction. The second, and longer, 
part consisted of thirty-two scenarios where recusal might be appropriate and 
asked for the judges’ views on these scenarios, which dealt with professional 
relationships, personal relationships, and prior knowledge derived from other 
judicial proceedings. We describe the methodology and results in detail elsewhere.7 
Three findings from that earlier study are significant for present purposes. The 
first is that reported decisions significantly under-represent the incidence of 
recusal because most of the time judges recuse themselves of their own motion 
without formal process and without issuing reasons. Two-thirds of our survey 
respondents indicated that they recused themselves between one and five times 
in a typical year. Another 19 per cent reported that they recused themselves more 
than five times in a typical year, and only 14 per cent indicated that they would 
not recuse themselves at all in a typical year. More than half of the respondents 
(55 per cent) indicated that they recused themselves of their own motion more 
than 90 per cent of the time, and another 30 per cent reported that they did so 
between 50 per cent and 90 per cent of the time. Only 12 per cent indicated that 
they never recused themselves of their own motion.8 These findings are consistent 
with John Leubsdorf ’s observation that American jurisprudence on recusal and 
disqualification is weighted heavily in favour of decisions explaining why it was 
appropriate for the judge to sit because American judges are obliged to give 
6. See Philip Bryden, “Legal Principles Governing the Disqualification of Judges” (2003) 82 
Can Bar Rev 555 at 596.
7. Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg,” supra note 4.
8. Ibid, 576-77.
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written reasons for rejecting an application to disqualify themselves, whereas, 
those who do recuse themselves are not required to, and typically do not, give 
written reasons for doing so.9
The second finding that is significant for present purposes is that most of 
the survey respondents had a very weak sense of common practice concerning 
issues that are, in theory, governed by local tradition. In Canada, the “reasonable 
apprehension of bias” test is thought to potentially disqualify judges from hearing 
cases involving their former clients or involving lawyers with whom they previously 
practiced law. This is true even though the judge has no personal knowledge 
of the case from his or her time in practice and no close personal relationship 
with the lawyer from his or her former firm who is arguing the matter before 
the judge. The breadth of this prohibition is mitigated by what is described as 
a “cooling off period” after which the judge may hear cases involving former 
clients or involving lawyers with whom the judge practised. This cooling-off 
period applies absent other disqualifying circumstances, such as a close personal 
relationship with the lawyer or client or personal involvement with the matter 
prior to the judge’s appointment to the bench. The Canadian Judicial Council’s 
publication Ethical Principles for Judges offers the following advice:
With respect to the judge’s former law partners, or associates and former clients, 
the traditional approach is to use a “cooling off period,” often established by local 
tradition at 2, 3 or 5 years and in any event at least as long as there is any indebtedness 
between the firm and the judge ....10
Our survey asked if the courts in their jurisdiction had an accepted “cooling 
off period” after which it was appropriate for a judge to hear cases where the 
judge’s former client is a party or the judge’s former firm is representing a party. 
We asked separate questions regarding former law firm colleagues and former 
clients, and the majority of respondents answered that there was no accepted 
cooling-off period in either case.11 A minority of the judges in most jurisdictions 
answered “yes” to both questions,12 though the response that there was an accepted 
cooling-off period was stronger for former law firms than for former clients.13 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions (Alberta, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick) 
9. John Leubsdorf, “Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification” (1987) 62 NYU L 
Rev 237 at 244-45.
10. Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial 
Council, 1998) at 52.
11. Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg,” supra note 4 at 602-603 (charts 8 and 9).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
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the majority view was that there was an accepted cooling-off period for law firms, 
though not for clients.14
The final relevant finding from our survey is that the “reasonable 
apprehension of bias” test appears to give very limited guidance to judges in 
addressing relatively common but analytically marginal fact patterns. The facts 
are analytically marginal because judges encounter situations that may plausibly 
be argued to give rise to bias concerns, but the legal test for whether a reasonable 
apprehension of bias exists only marginally constrains the outcome of the analysis 
for whether the judge should recuse. This was evident from the high degree of 
variation in the responses to the thirty-two scenarios posed in the survey. Only 
for one scenario was there near-universal agreement (more than 90 per cent) on 
one of the four possible answers we offered to the question of whether or not 
the respondent would be recused. In another five scenarios there was clearly a 
dominant view, with 65 to 89 per cent of the respondents agreeing on a single 
answer. In another nine scenarios, between 50 per cent and 64 per cent of the 
respondents selected the most popular answer. On the other hand, in seventeen 
of the thirty-two scenarios, no single answer attracted the support of 50 per cent 
of the respondents. In eleven scenarios, the most popular answer attracted the 
support of between 40 per cent and 49 per cent of the respondents, and in the 
case of six scenarios, no single answer received the support of as many as 40 per 
cent of the respondents.15
Based on the survey, we proposed that the “reasonable apprehension of bias” 
test itself could be modified to give judges a better understanding of the rationale for 
trends in the jurisprudence that are otherwise difficult to comprehend and better 
tools with which to make decisions about whether or not to recuse themselves in 
marginal cases.16 Our objective here is similar: to make the law governing judicial 
disqualification more transparent and easier to apply consistently.
We take a relatively modest approach to statutory reform because we are 
of the view that the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test is basically sound 
and because we are not convinced that making judicial disqualification either 
substantially more difficult or (more likely, if the American discourse is any 
indicator) substantially easier would fundamentally alter the public perception 
14. Ibid at 601-603.
15. Ibid at 579-80.
16. Jula Hughes & Philip Bryden, “Refining the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias Test: 
Providing Judges Better Tools for Addressing Judicial Disqualification” (2013) 36 Dal L J 
171 [Hughes & Bryden, “Refining the Test”].
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of the judicial system, at least in Canada.17 This is not to suggest that we believe 
that all segments of the Canadian public are equally satisfied with the Canadian 
judicial system or even that everyone who goes through a legal process in Canada 
is completely convinced of the judge’s impartiality. Rather, our approach flows 
from the view that making laws that are designed to satisfy the public that judges 
are impartial represents only one element in a larger enterprise of satisfying 
the public that the judicial system is accessible, efficient, and responsive, and 
produces just results.18 The optimal point of balance between achieving this 
public satisfaction and providing litigants with reassurance about judicial 
impartiality is likely to be elusive, and in our view there are times when it is more 
productive to focus on the clarity and consistency of the rules governing judicial 
disqualification than on the precise content of the rules themselves.
17. In a fascinating study, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira used a national survey of 1,092 
Americans to explore the effects of campaign financing on their perceptions of judicial 
impartiality. They presented the survey respondents with a vignette drawn from the fact 
pattern in a recent US Supreme Court decision. See Caperton v AT Massey Coal Co, 556 
US 868 (2009), 129 S Ct 2252 [Caperton]. They varied the basic fact pattern in a variety 
of ways to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the respondents’ perceptions of the 
judge’s impartiality and their overall perception of the impartiality of the justice system were 
altered in response to these variations. Variations included such things as whether or not 
the judge accepted a campaign contribution, whether and to what extent the contribution 
influenced the judge’s electoral success, whether or not the judge recused, and whether or not 
the judge’s vote influenced the outcome of the case in favour of the campaign contributor. 
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, “Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, 
and Recusals: Results from a National Survey” (2013) 10 J Empirical Legal Studies 76. One of 
their key findings was that:
…recusals can do something to rescue the fairness of courts, but that recusal alone is insufficient 
to repair the damage created by a contributions-based perceived conflict of interest. Perhaps 
no one really expects that recusal is a perfect palliative for conflicts but now we have national 
evidence of the limits of that practice. We observe, however, that this experiment also discovers 
that recusal might succeed in boosting perceptions of fairness and impartiality to at least a 
marginally acceptable level (ibid at 96).
18. On the importance of these issues, see Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and 
Family Matters, Access to Civil and Family Justice, A Roadmap for Change (Ottawa: Action 
Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, 2013), online: <http://www.
cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf>.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN LAW GOVERNING 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
In both Canada and the United States, judicial impartiality is a constitutionally 
protected right.19 The content of this right is informed by the common law in both 
jurisdictions, though American thinking is influenced by English common law as 
it existed prior to the American revolution, whereas Canadian law is influenced 
by English common law as it had evolved by the middle of the nineteenth 
century. In the United States, considerable discretion is left to Congress and state 
legislatures to determine the precise parameters of the law governing judicial 
disqualification.20 Contemporary law governing judicial disqualification at both 
the federal and state level is significantly shaped by legislative action. The law in 
both countries begins with a presumption of judicial impartiality, but there are 
significant differences in terms of what is needed to displace the presumption of 
judicial impartiality in the absence of statutory intervention.
The Canadian constitution’s commitment to judicial impartiality has been 
interpreted in a manner that is informed by the modern common law “reasonable 
apprehension of bias” test.21 Our courts have taken the view that, since it will 
usually be impossible to determine whether or not a judge is actually biased, 
the question is whether there are objective circumstances that would cause a 
19. In Canada, this is made explicit for criminal trials in s 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 11(d). It reads, 
“Any person charged with an offence has the right … (d) to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.” The constitutional standard for judicial impartiality is the same as the common 
law “reasonable apprehension of bias” standard and is linked to broader concepts of judicial 
independence and fundamental justice. See R v RDS, [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para 31, 161 
NSR (2d) 241 [RDS] (respecting the “reasonable apprehension of bias” standard); Reference 
re: Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of PEI, [1997] 3 SCR 3 at paras 111-13, 
156 Nfld & PEIR 1 [Provincial Judges Reference] (respecting judicial independence); Ruffo 
v Conseil de la Magistrature, [1995] 4 SCR 267 at para 38 (available on CanLii) (respecting 
fundamental justice); Pearlman v Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991] 2 
SCR 869, 84 DLR (4th) 105 (respecting fundamental justice). In the United States, the 
constitutional concern for judicial impartiality flows from judicial interpretation of the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See e.g. Caperton, supra note 17; 
Withrow v Larkin 421 US 35 (1975), 95 S Ct 1456.
20. See FTC v Cement Institute, 333 US 683 at 702 (1948), 68 S Ct 793; Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 
510 at 523 (1927), 47 S Ct 437.
21. See RDS, supra note 19 at paras 31, 46, 48-49; Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 19 
at paras 111-13.
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reasonable person to believe that the judge was not impartial.22 The existence 
of objective circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that, 
on balance, the judge would either consciously or unconsciously fail to decide 
the case fairly, is sufficient in Canada to displace the presumption of impartiality. 
Because common law and constitutional concepts of impartiality are essentially 
the same, judicial disqualification decisions in Canada are almost invariably made 
using common law standards.23
As noted above, American constitutional law governing judicial 
disqualification is influenced by pre-Revolutionary English common law, 
which took a restrictive approach to judicial disqualification and required 
disqualification only where the judge had a financial interest in the outcome 
of the dispute.24 Even though English common law was using a variation of the 
familiar “apprehension of bias” framework by the mid-nineteenth century,25 
American courts did not modify the common law to adopt an “apprehension of 
bias” approach to judicial disqualification. The due process protections in the US 
Constitution have therefore been interpreted as preventing a probability of actual 
bias on the part of the judge, as opposed to guaranteeing that there will be no 
appearance that a judge might be biased.26
The evolution of American law of judicial disqualification has accordingly 
taken place primarily through federal and state statutes, though state constitutions 
and rules of court also contain rules expanding disqualification in circumstances 
beyond those required by the US Constitution. Federal and state statutes have 
22. Wewaykum, supra note 3 at paras 66-67; RDS, supra note 19 at paras 31-49 (L’Heureux-Dubé 
and McLachlin JJ), 111-15 (Cory J).
23. As discussed in greater detail below, both arts 201-205 of the new Code of Civil Procedure 
(RLRQ c C-25.01) enacted by the Quebec National Assembly in 2014 and arts 234-42 
of its predecessor, the Code of Civil Procedure (RSQ c C-25), set out rules governing the 
disqualification of Quebec judges in civil proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure, arts 201-205 
CCP [New Code of Civil Procedure]; Code of Civil Procedure arts 234-42 CCP. Although 
this has not always been the case, in recent years the judicial disqualification provisions of 
the pre-2014 versions of the Code were interpreted in a manner that was designed to make 
them broadly consistent with the common law approach to judicial disqualification. See e.g. 
Dufour v 99516 Canada Inc, [2001] RJQ 1202 (available on QL) (QC CA) [Dufour].
24. See Caperton, supra note 17. See more generally, Richard Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, 
Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, 2d ed (Berkeley: Banks & Jordan Law Publishing Co, 
1997), ch 1 [Flamm, Judicial Disqualification]; Richard Flamm, “The History of Judicial 
Disqualification in America” (2013) 52 Judges’ Journal 12.
25. See Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852), 3 HLC 759, 10 ER 301 (HL).
26. See Caperton, supra note 17; Raymond McKoski, “Disqualifying Judges When Their 
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard” (2014) 56 
Arizona L Rev 411 at 431-33 [“Disqualifying Judges”].
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expanded disqualification using two different techniques, though these approaches 
are not mutually exclusive and some jurisdictions employ both. The first technique 
is to adopt a general requirement that judges must disqualify themselves in any 
proceeding “in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”27 
supplemented by a series of more specific rules identifying instances in which a 
judge is disqualified. This approach is inspired by the 1972 ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct (ABA Model Code), initially adopted by the ABA’s House 
of Delegates in 1972 and subsequently modified in 1990, 2007, and 2010. The 
ABA Model Code is designed as a set of ethical principles governing the conduct 
and discipline of judges, but the provisions of what was originally Canon 3E, 
now Rule 2.11, dealing with disqualification, were often incorporated directly 
or with some modification into statutes that gave parties rights to require judges 
to disqualify themselves in the circumstances enumerated by the statute.28 The 
second technique is to adopt what are described as “peremptory disqualification” 
rules, provisions that essentially allow a party to a proceeding to disqualify a 
judge simply by alleging that the judge has a bias against the party or in favour 
of a party adverse in interest. Peremptory disqualification provisions have often 
been interpreted restrictively by American courts,29 but a significant theme in 
contemporary American legal discourse is a debate over whether peremptory 
27. See e.g. 28 USC § 455(a) (1948).
28. See e.g. ibid, § 455.
29. For example, Richard Flamm argues persuasively that 28 USC § 144 was originally intended 
by Congress to create a peremptory disqualification regime for federal district court judges. 
Richard Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, supra note 24. § 144 reads, in relevant part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient 
affidavit that a judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either 
against him or in favour of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but 
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
 When this provision was originally considered by the United States Supreme Court in Berger 
v US, the Court concluded that the allegation in the affidavit had to be “legally sufficient” 
to warrant the disqualification of the judge, thereby transforming the provision into one 
that only required disqualification where there was just cause. Berger v US (1921), 255 US 
22, 55 S Ct 629. See also Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex Perschbacher, “The Elusive Goal of 
Impartiality” (2011) 97 Iowa L Rev 181 at 211 [“Elusive Goal”].
HUGHES, BRYDEN,  FROM PRINCIPLES TO RULES 863
disqualification should be expanded.30 American disqualification law at the state 
level also differs significantly from the law in common law jurisdictions such as 
Canada and England because it has to accommodate the fact that judges in many 
states are elected. As the cost of running successful judicial election campaigns has 
escalated, there has been considerable debate about whether current approaches 
to judicial disqualification in cases involving contributors to judicial election 
campaigns are adequate.31
For present purposes, it is more relevant to explore the detailed rules found 
in provisions that expand upon a general requirement of disqualification where 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, than it is to discuss peremptory 
disqualification or judicial elections. Interesting as the peremptory disqualification 
and judicial election debates are, they have little resonance in the context of 
Canada and other comparable jurisdictions. Moreover, because the specific rules 
governing disqualification can be understood to represent specific examples of 
a more general requirement of disqualification wherever a judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, one can relatively easily imagine them inspiring 
rules that could supplement a more general “reasonable apprehension of bias” test 
for disqualification in Canada and other common law jurisdictions.
The main federal disqualification statute, 28 USC § 455 (and in particular, 
§ 455 (b)–(f )), is a good example of this type of provision. 28 USC § 455 begins 
with a general prohibition in subsection 455(a) that states: “Any justice, judge, 
or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding 
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Subsection 455(b) 
begins with the statement that “[the judge] shall also disqualify himself in the 
following circumstances ... .” As a result, subsection (b) puts in place a regime 
of automatic disqualification that does not require an inquiry into whether or 
not the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to question the judge’s 
30. See e.g. McKoski, “Disqualifying Judges,” supra note 26; Charles Geyh, “Draft Report of the 
ABA Judicial Disqualification Project” (2008), online: <http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/judicial_independence/jdp_geyh_report.authcheckdam.pdf> at 
60-65; James Sample & Michael Young, “Invigorating Judicial Disqualification: Ten Potential 
Reforms” (2008) 92 Judicature 26 at 27-28; Debra Lyn Bassett, “Judicial Disqualification in 
the Federal Appellate Courts” (2002) 87 Iowa L Rev 1213 at 1224, 1251-1256.
31. See e.g. Bassett & Perschbacher, “Elusive Goal,” supra note 29; Christina Newton, 
“Interpreting Caperton: a Hybrid Solution to the Public Choice Problems of Judicial 
Elections” (2011) 8 J L Econ and Pol’y 143.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL864
impartiality.32 Subsection (b) has five clauses. The first requires disqualification 
where the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party” or has 
“personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”33 
The second mandates disqualification where the judge, while in private practice, 
“served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,” where “a lawyer with whom 
[the judge] previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer 
concerning the matter,” and where the judge or a lawyer with whom the 
judge previously practised law “has been a material witness” concerning the 
proceeding.34 The third provides that the judge is disqualified where he or she 
“served in government employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, 
advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion 
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.”35
It is worth pausing at this point to note that, although these provisions reflect 
themes that would be familiar to judges applying the “reasonable apprehension 
of bias” test for disqualification in Canada, they are both narrower and in some 
respects broader than the grounds for disqualification found in the Canadian 
jurisprudence. The second clause is narrower than Canadian disqualification 
practice in the sense that it only requires disqualification where the judge 
previously acted as a lawyer at an earlier stage in the same proceeding or where a 
member of the judge’s former law firm acted in the proceeding while the judge was 
still associated with the firm.36 Canadian common law would generally regard the 
judge’s association with the firm or with the client as a basis for disqualification 
32. The common law in England and New Zealand draws a distinction between circumstances in 
which the judge’s disqualification is automatic and those where disqualification is the result 
of a reasonable apprehension of bias. See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex 
p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), [2000] 1 AC 119, [1999] 1 All ER 577 HL (Eng); Porter v Magill, 
[2002] [2001] UKHL 67, 2 AC 357; Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2007] NZCA 
334, [2007] 3 NZLR 495; Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No 
1), [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35, recalled [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76. 
In Canada and Australia, the common law employs a unified reasonable apprehension of 
bias test to deal with all judicial disqualification cases. See Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the 
Iceberg,” supra note 4; Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000), [2000] HCA 63, 
176 ALR 644 [Ebner]. As a practical matter, Canadian and Australian courts would typically 
reach the same result as English and New Zealand courts in situations where automatic 
disqualification would be required, but they would do so using a “reasonable apprehension of 
bias” test. See Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, “Legal Principles Governing the Disqualification 
of Judges” (July 29, 2014) at 7-21, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2473557>.
33. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(1).
34. Ibid, § 455(b)(2).
35. Ibid, § 455(b)(3).
36. Ibid, § 455(b)(2).
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for at least a period of time, whether or not the judge was involved with the matter 
in question. At the same time, the second and third clauses37 contain a slightly 
broader prohibition on judicial involvement in a matter than would be required 
by Canadian law in the sense that in Canada the passage of time is a relevant 
consideration for the purpose of deciding whether a judge is disqualified.38
The fourth clause deals with the judge’s personal financial interests as well 
as those of his or her spouse or minor children residing in the judge’s household, 
as well as “any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome 
of the proceeding.”39 The statute includes an elaborate definition of financial 
interest that not only defines what will be regarded as a financial interest but 
also excludes certain types of interests from the definition.40 “Ownership in a 
mutual or common investment fund that holds securities,” for example, “is 
not a ‘financial interest’ in such securities unless the judge participates in the 
management of the fund.”41 As a result, this automatic disqualification clause 
treats financial interests in a way that is substantially similar to, if not necessarily 
identical to, the way they would be treated under Canadian law, but gives much 
greater clarity and more specific guidance than one would find in Canadian law.42
The fifth automatic disqualification clause applies where a member of the 
judge’s family is a party, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding, “is known by 
the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome 
of the proceeding,” or is “to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material 
witness in the proceeding.”43 Once again, Canadian practice concerning judicial 
disqualification on the basis of family relationship would produce substantially 
similar, if not necessarily identical, results to this provision.44
37. Ibid, § 455(b)(2)-(3).
38. Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 52.
39. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(4).
40. Ibid, § 455(d)(4).
41. Ibid, § 455(d)(4)(i).
42. Ibid, § 455(b)(4). As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in the Wewaykum case, 
Canadian common law does not use the concept of automatic disqualification, and all types 
of disqualification, including ones based on the judge’s financial interest in the outcome, 
are decided on the basis of a “reasonable apprehension of bias” test. Wewaykum, supra note 
3 at paras 72-73. On the other hand, the application of that test will normally result in 
Canadian judges being disqualified where they have a direct and material financial interest in 
the outcome of the case before them. See Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 45-46 
(paras 6.E.5-6.E.7).
43. Ibid, § 455(b)(5).
44. See Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 44-46 (paras 6.E.3-6.E.7).
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Finally, subsections (e) and (f ) explicitly address the issue of waiver by the 
parties.45 Waiver is not permitted in relation to the grounds of disqualification 
enumerated in subsection 455(b), but it is allowed where disqualification arises 
under the more general provisions of subsection 455(a) “provided it is preceded 
by full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.”46 Outside of 
Quebec, Canadian law governing waiver does not appear to draw any distinctions 
concerning the circumstances in which parties can waive disqualification, but 
there is a right to be fully informed of the relevant facts before the waiver doctrine 
will be applied.47
While the ABA Model Code represents the dominant model for state laws 
governing judicial disqualification, there is considerable variation in matters of 
detail even among states that follow it. To take just one example, clause 170.1(2)
(B) of the California Code of Civil Procedure adopts a disqualification rule that 
is similar to Canadian practice with respect to a judge’s former colleagues in legal 
practice and former clients.48 After partially adopting the ABA Model Code by 
indicating in clause 2(A) that a judge is disqualified if he or she “served as a lawyer 
in the proceeding,” the California statute states:
B. A judge shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if within 
the past two years:
i. A party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party was 
a client the judge when the judge was in the private practice of law or 
a client of a lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the private 
practice of law.
ii. A lawyer in the proceeding was associated in the private practice of law.
This provision creates a presumptive rule of disqualification from the 
adjudication of cases involving former colleagues or personal or law firm clients 
during a two-year cooling-off period, while leaving in place a longer period of 
45. Ibid, § 455(e)-(f ).
46. Ibid, § 455(a)-(b).
47. See Lambert v Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48 at paras 7, 19-21, 206 NBR (2d) 346 [Lambert]. 
For the situation in Quebec, see the discussion below of art 242 of Quebec’s former Code of 
Civil Procedure. Code of Civil Procedure, art 242 CCP.
48. 48 California Code of Civil Procedure, cl 170.1(a)(2)(B).
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disqualification if the judge was personally involved as a lawyer in some aspect of 
the proceeding.49
American law governing the procedure for judicial disqualification varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.50 In many instances, judges will recuse themselves 
of their own motion, especially if it is evident that they fall within one of the 
enumerated grounds upon which disqualification is required. Some American 
jurisdictions have specific rules governing the procedures to be used by a party 
who seeks the disqualification of a judge who does not recuse himself or herself 
voluntarily, and in other jurisdictions the ordinary rules governing motion practice 
apply.51 Typically the judge whose disqualification is sought decides the motion, 
and in some jurisdictions the challenged judge has an affirmative obligation to 
do so.52 In other jurisdictions, the judge whose disqualification is sought has the 
discretion to transfer the decision to another judge, but this discretion is not 
commonly exercised.53 There are some jurisdictions where a judge who receives a 
motion seeking his or her recusal has the option of deciding to recuse himself or 
herself, but if that option is not taken, the decision on whether or not the judge 
is disqualified must be referred to another judge.54
III. AN OVERVIEW OF GERMAN LAW GOVERNING JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION
As in Canada, the guarantee of impartial adjudication in Germany is thought to 
have constitutional dimensions. However, the Basic Law does not expressly grant 
a specific right to an impartial tribunal. The jurisprudence instead anchors the 
right in two sections of the Basic Law: the general principle of the rule of law 
49. Clause 170.1(a)(2)(C) creates a comparable presumption for any judge who “served as a 
lawyer for or officer of a public agency that is a party” to a proceeding. In this instance, 
the judge is presumed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding “if he or she personally 
advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in 
the proceeding.” Ibid, cl 170.1(a)(2)(C).
50. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, supra note 24, ch 17.
51. Ibid, § 17.2.
52. Ibid, § 17.6 at 499.
53. Ibid, § 17.6 at 501-502.
54. Ibid, § 17.6 at 502. See e.g. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18a, ss (f )-(g).
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(Rechtsstaatsprinzip) in article 20,55 and the right to a lawful judge in article 101.56 
The latter clause introduces the notion of a lawful judge (gesetzlicher Richter).57 
At its core, this right protects against secret, ad hoc, or otherwise unchecked 
appointments of tribunals for specific purposes. In Canadian terms, it seems to 
be most closely related to the right of access to a court of inherent jurisdiction.
In the jurisprudence of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court 
(Constitutional Court), the right to a lawful judge has been amplified to give 
content to the notion that lawfulness includes impartiality. The right to one’s 
lawful judge has a negative and a positive dimension: the negative right not to be 
subjected to a judge who is tainted by bias and the positive right to adjudication 
of the case before the court by the assigned judge absent a well-founded bias 
concern. The latter right strongly implies a duty to sit. Judicial independence is 
separately guaranteed in article 97.58 In criminal cases, courts have also resorted 
to the right to free choice of counsel in some recusal situations.59
German federal law codifies judicial disqualification in the various rules 
of court found in the courts’ enabling statutes. The constitutional, criminal, 
and civil courts have structurally similar rules, but categories of automatic 
disqualification are tailored to the jurisdictional subject matter of the respective 
courts. Also, as the time of enactment varies, so does the actual wording. Various 
administrative courts of specialized jurisdiction incorporate the civil code model 
by reference.60 Compared to its Canadian counterpart, German law favours a 
duty to sit, both substantively (by requiring judges to sit in some situations where 
a Canadian judge would likely recuse) and procedurally (by ensuring that judges 
are not able to bow out easily or unnecessarily). At the same time, by providing 
55. The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive, and the judiciary 
by law and justice. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, online: <https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/> [Basic Law].
56. Klaus Schreiber, “ZR - Ausschließung und Ablehnung des Richters im Zivilprozess” (2011) 
33:10 JURA - Juristische Ausbildung 745; ibid. Art 101 (1)(2) provides: “No one may be 
removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge.”
57. Christoph Sowada, Der gesetzliche Richter im Strafverfahren (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002).
58. Basic Law, supra note 55, art 97.
59. German Code of Criminal Procedure [StPO], s 137(1), online: <http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/> (official English translation by Brian Duffett and 
Monika Ebinger, updated translation by Kathleen Müller-Rostin) [StPO].
60.  § 54 Abs 1 VwGO; Alexander Ignor, “Befangenheit im Prozess” (2012) 5 Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 228 at 230. Note that administrative courts are not 
equivalent to Canadian administrative tribunals as judges rather than tribunal members sit 
on these courts.
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grounds for automatic disqualification, the statutes introduce bright-line rules 
for some high-frequency situations.
The statutory rules regarding disqualification proceed in two parts. First, 
they set out situations that automatically disqualify a judge from hearing a case. 
Second, they provide for recusal motions by a litigant or a judge where a fear of bias 
exists or where a judge attempts to sit in a situation of automatic disqualification. 
In the case of the Constitutional Court, the statute additionally narrows the 
categories of automatic disqualification by excluding certain subcategories from 
the application of the more general principles.
Statutes also provide for procedural issues including who decides the issue, 
waiver, replacement procedures, and appellate remedies. These are potentially 
of significant interest to Canadian courts, which have typically developed their 
recusal procedures ad hoc.
While there is some variation in language, criminal, civil, and constitutional 
courts all contemplate automatic disqualification for substantially the same 
reasons: (1) Involvement by the judge or a close family member in the litigation 
as a litigant or witness or, in the case of criminal courts, as victim;61 (2) prior 
professional involvement in the matter as counsel or police officer; and (3) prior 
judicial involvement.
Despite these commonalities, there are important differences among the 
courts, particularly as they relate to the first and third categories. As regards the 
first category, personal involvement, the Constitutional Court Act excludes family 
status, occupation, ethnic origin, political party membership, and analogous 
grounds as constituting personal involvement.62
As regards the third category, in criminal courts, the part of the criminal 
procedure rules dealing with recusal would not appear to bar the participation of 
a trial judge in a new trial but merely in the (appellate) decision to order a new 
trial. However, section 354(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) 
precludes remittal to the trial judge following a successful appeal. It requires a 
different chamber of the lower court to hear the new trial.63 Thus, unlike in 
Canada, it is not open to the appellate court to remit a matter to the trial judge 
61. In all cases, a close family member is defined as related by blood to the third degree or by 
marriage to the second degree.
62. 62 Federal Constitutional Court Act [BVerfGG]), § 18 (translation by the Court available 
online: <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/
BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1>).
63. StPO, supra note 59.
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for determination in light of the appellate decision.64 This represents a different 
weighing of two competing objectives: Avoiding the possible perception of a 
closed mind is preferred in the German context, while in the Canadian context, 
efficiency and judicial resource management tip the balance in favour of a 
power to remit.
In civil courts, there are three grounds related to prior judicial involvement 
that give rise to automatic disqualification: (1) prior involvement in the final 
adjudication of a matter; (2) prior involvement in a matter in which undue delay 
is alleged; and (3) prior judicial involvement in mediation or other alternative 
dispute resolution measures related to a particular matter.
In an interesting variation on the theme, the Constitutional Court Act also 
disqualifies judges who have had prior judicial involvement by reason of their 
office or profession but goes on to limit the scope of this ground of disqualification 
in two important ways. First, it excludes prior involvement in the legislative 
process as constituting disqualifying prior involvement, and second, it excludes 
as a disqualifying ground the articulation of an academic opinion in relation to a 
legal question of relevance to the proceeding.
In addition to automatic disqualification, a party may move for the recusal 
of a judge in all courts for two reasons: one, because of a fear of bias, and two, 
because a judge chose to sit despite the presence of automatic disqualification 
grounds. The test for a fear of bias is whether, based on a reasoned apprehension 
of the facts as they are known to it, the objecting party has cause to believe 
that the judge will adopt an inner stance towards the party that may interfere 
negatively with his or her impartiality or open mind.65 Courts have emphasized 
that the question of judicial disqualification should be analyzed based on the 
knowledge of the litigant rather than that of a legal insider.66
Generally, the jurisprudence is concerned with situations giving rise to a 
fear of bias and, in particular, with the relationship between the enumerated 
grounds of automatic disqualification and arguable analogous grounds that 
might give rise to a fear of bias. The statutory rules are not exhaustive. One area 
that gives rise to bias motions in civil courts is that of personal relationships 
not covered by the automatic disqualification rules. Herbert Taubner suggests 
a categorization of the case law relating to personal bias into five classes: family 
64. Gunther Arzt, Der befangene Strafrichter: Zugleich eine Kritik an der Beschränkung der 
Befangenheit auf die Parteilichkeit (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969) at 1. 
65. Gunter Widmaier & Stephan Barton, Münchener Anwaltshandbuch Strafverteidigung, 
(Beck-Online: CH Beck, 2006) at para 73.
66. BGH (1988) StV 88, 417; BGH (1968) NJW 68, 710; ibid at para 73.
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relationships, memberships in clubs or corporations, acceptance of favours, 
personal relationships with professional litigation participants other than lawyers, 
and personal relationships with lawyers.67
Civil courts have found that a broader range of family and personal 
relationships may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias than merely 
those covered by the automatic disqualification rules. Family relations and 
other personal relationships warranting recusal include engagements, close 
friendships, personal antagonism, paternity or maternity of a child or having 
a child in common, and love affairs. On the other hand, the jurisprudence is 
clear in limiting this extension: Absent additional considerations, siblings-in-law 
(and similar family and social relationships that are not close or not current) and 
professional encounters (e.g., a builder or tradesperson doing work at the judge’s 
house) do not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The literature is split 
on whether the relationship has to be direct or includes relationships with the 
judge’s spouse.68
Memberships in organizations warrant recusal only if a club is very small, the 
judge has a leadership role, and the club is directly involved in litigation. Since 
judges, like all other citizens, have a constitutional right to be a member of a 
political party, such membership is never a reason to recuse.
The legislature has taken a slightly different and narrower approach to 
disqualifying personal relationships in criminal courts. While a criminal court 
judge is automatically disqualified where the alleged victim is his or her spouse, 
the prosecutor-spouse is not included in the list of automatic disqualification 
relationships. Some commentators have argued that a judge should not preside 
over a trial where her spouse is the prosecutor. This argument is at variance with 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court suggesting that in the absence of 
disqualification language, a personal relationship with the prosecutor is not in 
itself a basis for recusal.69 Further, the legislative choice permitting judges to sit 
when they have a close personal relationship with the prosecutor is clear.
67. Herbert Taubner, Der befangene Zivilrichter (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 2005).
68. Ibid, citing Christian Stemmler, Befangenheit im Richteramt: eine systematische Darstellung 
der Ausschliessungs- und Ablehnungsgründe unter Berücksichtigung des gesetzlichen Richters als 
materielles Prinzip (PhD Dissertation, University of Tübingen, 1975) (favouring the narrower 
view); Taubner, ibid, citing Herbert Pabst v. Ohain, Die Ablehnung eines Richters wegen 
Besorgnis der Befangenheit aus politischen Gründen (PhD Dissertation, University of Freiburg, 
1932) (for the broader view).
69. Klaus Ellbogen & Felix Schneider, “Besorgnis der Befangenheit bei Ehe zwischen Richterin 
und Staatsanwalt” (2012) 5 Juristische Rundschau 188.
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As in other institutional design choices, there are competing values at stake 
here. The appearance of impartiality from the perspective of the accused will 
likely be affected when the judge is married to the prosecutor. On the other hand, 
judge-prosecutor marriages are very commonplace, and recusal on that basis 
would affect a large number of docketing decisions, particularly in small towns.70 
The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) has recently ruled in a 
civil context that recusal is warranted where the judge is married to someone in 
the same law firm as counsel in the case before the court, even where there is no 
evidence that the lawyer-spouse and the judge had discussed the file or that the 
lawyer-spouse’s financial interests were significantly affected.71 In this case, the 
judge was married to a lawyer who practiced in the same law firm as respondent 
counsel. Since that decision was grounded in constitutional considerations, 
it may well be that the criminal court jurisprudence will follow suit.
This situation will be familiar to Canadian judges, as are prior professional 
relationships between judges and lawyers. Indeed, one of the areas of judicial 
disqualification with significant difficulties in Canada concerns the question 
whether and when professional relationships give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. The issue arises with frequency because Canadian judges 
are typically appointed from the practising bar and tend to have a well-established 
set of relationships with fellow lawyers at the time of their appointment. This 
problem arises less frequently in Germany because most judges are appointed 
as full-time judges immediately following their law studies and a brief period 
of clerkship (frequently served in courts or prosecution offices).72 There are 
two significant exceptions: The first is that a full professor of law is entitled to 
70. American law typically reaches the opposite conclusion in the balancing of these concerns. 
At the federal level, judges are prohibited from sitting in cases where a spouse is acting 
as counsel. See 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(5). In Florida, the Code of Judicial 
Conduct provides that
[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself … where the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person 
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; … a lawyer in the 
proceeding; is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding; [or] is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material 
witness in the proceeding” [emphasis added].
 Canon 3(E)(1)(d).
71. (2012) V ZB 102/11 (BGH 5th Zivilsenat) (Germany). See Katrin Dittert, 
“Richterablehnung wegen Tätigkeit dessen Ehegatten in der von der Gegenseite beauftragten 
Rechtsanwaltskanzlei” (2012) 15 jurisPR-MietR note 5.
72. Keith R. Fisher, “Education for Judicial Aspirants” (2011) 31 J Nat’l Ass’n Admin L Judiciary 
99 at 115 (reprinted).
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hold part-time judicial office, and the second is that the appointment practice 
of the Constitutional Court, as discussed below in more detail, routinely sees 
limited-term appointments from the public law professoriate. It is thus not 
surprising that some of the most contentious cases regarding recusal in response 
to professional relationships arise in the Constitutional Court.
One of the most controversial recusal decisions of the Constitutional Court 
involved a politician who was a member of a law firm with which one of the 
judges of the Court was associated.73 The Federal Minister of the Interior had 
allegedly accepted donations in contravention of the country’s party financing 
laws. Justice Jentsch gave notice to his judicial colleagues of facts that might 
require recusal.74 In a split decision, four judges of the Court ruled that there was 
no reasonable apprehension of bias since mere membership in a political party 
was not a cause for recusal and Justice Jentsch could not be said to have a direct 
interest in the outcome of the litigation.75 This was the result because Justice 
Jentsch’s membership in the firm had been suspended by operation of law during 
his tenure on the court and despite the fact that the law firm’s name continued to 
include both his own name and Minister Kanther’s.
When a related matter came to the Court in 2003, Justice Jentsch again gave 
notice of a potential apprehension of bias. He repeated his explanation about the 
membership of Mr. Kanther and his ongoing relationship with the law firm. This 
time, a unanimous Constitutional Court found that Justice Jentsch’s relationship 
with Mr. Kanther did give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that he 
should not sit. The Court distinguished its earlier decision on the basis that the 
prior review had taken place in the context of an abstract judicial review whereas 
73. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in this regard has a prominent and unusual 
commentator. In 2000, former Chief Justice Benda, who had led the Court until 1983, 
published a paper in which he criticized, with some venom, the recusal practice of his former 
Court. In it, he argued that the Constitutional Court applied too strong a presumption of 
impartiality, in part out of elitism or arrogance (asserting that a judge of the highest court 
is presumed to be of such high calibre, intellectually and morally, to make bias a virtual 
impossibility) and in part out of excessive collegial courtesy (noting that both in cases of 
applications and in cases of self-disclosure, it is the judicial colleagues of the impugned 
judge who adjudicate the motion). See Ernst Benda, “Befangenes zur Befangenheit” 
(2000) NJW 3620.
74. He was a founding partner in a law firm that now, with his consent, included the minister. 
He noted that his membership in the firm had been suspended for the duration of his tenure 
on the Court by virtue of § 104 of the Constitutional Court Act. BverfGG, supra note 62, § 
104. He also advised his colleagues that he no longer participated in the financial, revenue, 
and governance decisions of the firm except in fundamental matters of membership.
75. (2000) BVerfGE 102, 192 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
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the current case involved a closer connection between the allegations and Mr. 
Kanther. Thus, the personal reputation of Mr. Kanther and, by implication, the 
personal connection between him and the judge, were now squarely in issue. 
An adverse finding of the Court against Mr. Kanther might implicate him in 
further proceedings and affect the interests of the law firm. The Court affirmed 
the general presumption that a judge of the Constitutional Court possesses the 
necessary independence and distance to enable him or her to act impartially and 
objectively but noted that the legislative scheme was designed to address what 
it called the “evil appearance” (böser Schein) of a possible lack of impartiality.76 
Upon reasonable appreciation of all of the circumstances, it therefore concluded 
that there was sufficient cause to doubt the impartiality of the judge because of 
his partnership with Mr. Kanther in the law firm.77 The difficulty encountered by 
the German court illustrates the usefulness of cooling-off periods adopted in the 
Canadian context and also highlights the importance of clear guidance for judges 
on post-retirement professional activities.
Another area where the Canadian and German experiences are structurally 
different but mutually illuminating is in their approaches to prior judicial 
involvement. A common source of applications for recusal in criminal cases is 
communications between the judge or presiding judge and one party. German 
law does not permit plea bargaining except under the direct supervision of the 
courts. Preparatory communications by the judge with one side lead to bias 
concerns in that the resulting ‘deal’ indicates a closed mind on the part of the 
judge.78 The federal parliament has now acted to regulate such communications79 
and the Constitutional Court has held that only communications specifically 
authorized by the Act are permitted, precluding informal arrangements.80 While 
the problem is tied to the peculiarities of German procedural law, the solution 
might have application in Canada. High-frequency bias problems may be subject 
to legislative bright-line solutions. This would support arguments we have made 
elsewhere on, for example, breach hearings.81
The question of how much assistance a judge may provide to a self-represented 
litigant before crossing the line into apparent partiality raised novel bias issues 
76. BVerfGE 108, 122 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
77. Ibid at paras 24-26.
78. (2007) 5 StR 227/07 (BGH, 5th Strafsenat) (Germany).
79. Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren vom 29. Juli 2009 (BGBl S. 2353) 
[Regulation of Communications in Criminal Proceedings Act, July 29, 2009].
80. (2013) BVerfGe, 2 BvR 2628/10 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
81. Hughes & Bryden, “Refining the Test,” supra note 16 at 191.
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in German civil courts, as has been the case in the United States82 and, more 
recently, in Canada.83 The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 2004 to require 
judges to play a more active case management role. This also means that they now 
provide more assistance to parties than previously thought appropriate in the 
generally adversarial system of civil justice in Germany. Gunnar Sticken argues 
that the novel obligations on judges to explain, inform, and prevent surprises 
may all operate to threaten judicial neutrality.84 Four situations are thought to 
give rise to concerns: (1) the judge directs a change in the pleadings; (2) the 
judge advises a party of an impending limitation period; (3) the judge is possibly 
obligated to explain the evaluation of evidence prior to rendering judgment; and 
(4) the party is or is not represented (does either scenario make a difference to the 
judicial obligation to advise?).
Sticken contends that neutrality requires that the judge not pursue “purposes” 
of his or her own as the adversarial nature of the proceedings is a necessary 
guarantor of impartiality. However, he accepts that promoting settlement does 
not undermine the impartiality of the judicial officer.85 Further, he concludes 
that the scope of the legislative change is modest and consistent with impartiality 
requirements. In his view, the new provisions do not require a judge to direct 
changes in pleadings or notify parties of a limitation period.86
On the other side of the coin, whether hostility between a judge and counsel 
is a reason to recuse is a complex question. The jurisprudence consistently holds 
that the hostility must spill over into hostility against the party, not merely the 
lawyer, and that the expression of such hostility must occur in the proceeding in 
which recusal is sought.
As in Canada, the expression of support, hostility, or any other views in a 
judicial capacity is dealt with distinctly from the question of any expression of 
views in an extra-judicial capacity. The statutory regime of the Constitutional 
Court Act contemplates exceptions to situations of automatic disqualification, 
several of which relate to the expression of views in an extrajudicial capacity. 
82. Jona Goldschmidt, “How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants” (1998-1999) 
82 Judicature 13.
83. Richard Devlin, C Adèle Kent & Susan Lightstone, “The Past, Present ... and Future(?) 
of Judicial Ethics Education in Canada” (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 1; Jona Goldschmidt, 
“Judicial Assistance to Self-represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian Experience” 
(2008–2009) 17 Mich St U Coll L J Int’l L 601.
84. Gunnar Sticken, Die ‘neue’ materielle Prozeßleitung (§ 139 ZPO) und die Unparteilichkeit des 
Richters (Köln Berlin München: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2004).
85. Ibid at 187.
86. Ibid at 185-90.
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The question about the scope of these exceptions is framed as exploring the 
relationship between cases of automatic disqualification and those warranting 
recusal on a case-by-case basis. For example, given the express terms of Article 
18,87 direct involvement in the legislative process does not disqualify a judge. 
Could advice given by a judge to government in a professional capacity ever 
give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? The current jurisprudence of both 
chambers of the Constitutional Court uses a “without more” test. Under this 
approach, the mere fact that a judge has previously come into contact with or 
has articulated views on a matter is never sufficient, without more, to justify 
disqualification. The rules of when certain additional facts are sufficient to unseat 
the very strong presumption in favour of a duty to sit are being developed on a 
case-by-case basis.
Another statutory exception to automatic disqualification relates to the 
expression of views in academic writing that might otherwise be thought to 
indicate a bias.88 Interestingly, the exception for academic writing is itself the 
result of a recusal decision by the Constitutional Court. The 1966 Leibholz 
decision involved a challenge to legislation that established state-sponsored party 
financing. Leibholz was a professor of law at Göttingen and Bruge. He had served 
on the Constitutional Court for fifteen years. Between the oral hearing and the 
release of the judgment, he presented a paper at a constitutional law conference 
in which he indicated a preference for state party financing. Upon application 
by two fringe parties, the Court decided to disqualify Leibholz. In its decision, 
the Court indicated that the issue was not actual partiality but a “concern about 
partiality” (Besorgnis der Befangenheit). It stated that the test was whether a person 
without involvement in the process, in a reasonable manner appreciating the 
entire context, would have cause to doubt the impartiality and objective stance 
of the judge.89 The legislature disagreed with the conclusion of the Court and 
responded to the ruling by adding an academic writing exception into Article 18.
87. BverfGG, supra note 62, § 18(2)(3) (“Involvement for the purposes of section 1 no. 2 shall 
not include … participating in the legislative procedure … .”).
88. This issue is peculiar to the German context. The public law professoriate has been a primary 
recruitment ground for judges on the Constitutional Court. Leading constitutional scholars 
make up the vast majority of appointees. Since appointments are presently subject to a 
non-renewable twelve-year term, the professorial appointment may bracket the judicial 
one. While judges do not teach during their judicial tenure, they frequently continue 
to participate in academic life including presenting at conferences. As a result, it is very 
common that judges would comment on any number of constitutional issues, many of which 
might come before the court during their tenure there.
89. BVerfGE 20, 26 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
HUGHES, BRYDEN,  FROM PRINCIPLES TO RULES 877
In addition to statutory rules for automatic disqualification and express 
rules for situations that do not warrant recusal, a third element common to 
all three statutory schemes that might be useful to consider in the Canadian 
context is a set of procedural provisions. These provisions address issues such 
as limitation periods and waivers, how to bring recusal motions, determining 
who hears the motion, and delineating appeal and self-disqualification processes. 
Generally, an application for recusal must be brought early in the proceeding: 
In civil court, the motion must be brought before the moving party makes its first 
appearance; in the Constitutional Court, prior to the oral hearing on the merits; 
and in criminal court, prior to the examination of the first defence witness. 
Early motions are facilitated by permitting a request for naming judges and lay 
adjudicators prior to trial.90
The application must be brought in the court seized of the matter and is 
typically heard by a panel of that court, in most circumstances excluding the 
judge in relation to whom the application is brought. Where the issue arises 
because a judge formally identifies a reason that might give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias, in most circumstances the recusal motion is also heard by a 
panel of the same court excluding the judge. A notable exception to the rule that 
a panel of the same court excluding the judge will hear the recusal motion can be 
found in the criminal rules of procedure. The trial judge himself or herself may 
determine whether the application is timely and, if appropriate, dismiss it for that 
reason. A panel not including the trial judge decides all other recusal motions. 
Dismissing a recusal motion on the basis of a finding that it was brought for 
purely tactical reasons has to be made by a unanimous panel, again excluding the 
trial judge. The decision to disqualify or recuse is not subject to appeal, but an 
unsuccessful recusal motion may be appealed as part of an appeal on the merits.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER 
THE QUEBEC CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The rules governing judicial disqualification in the province of Quebec differ 
historically from those in other Canadian provinces because the Quebec Code of 
90. StPO, supra note 59, s 24(3).
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Civil Procedure91 codifies the grounds for judicial disqualification. Luc Huppé has 
shown that until the 1970s, Quebec law employed a framework for determining 
when judges were disqualified that was quite distinct from the approach employed 
in the rest of Canada. Under this earlier Quebecois approach, the grounds for 
disqualification found in the Code of Civil Procedure were treated as the exclusive 
basis for judicial disqualification and were interpreted in a restrictive manner 
that was consistent with their origins in French law.92 These grounds were not 
linked conceptually to the common law concept of a reasonable apprehension of 
bias, though there was an obvious overlap between the enumerated grounds and 
situations that would be regarded as giving rise to disqualification at common 
law. Huppé suggests that the enactment of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms [Quebec Charter] in 1975, and in particular its guarantee in section 
23 of “a right to a full and equal, public and fair hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal,” created a conceptual tension in thinking about 
judicial impartiality in Quebec because the courts interpreted the concept of 
impartiality in section 23 in a manner that reflected the common law.93 Quebec 
courts began to treat the grounds for disqualification contained in the Code as 
non-exclusive, with the result that Quebec judges were subject to disqualification 
in circumstances that would give rise to a “reasonable apprehension of bias” even 
if these circumstances did not fall within the grounds enumerated in the Code.94
91. New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23. The National Assembly of Quebec enacted 
the new Code of Civil Procedure in February of 2014, but it was not proclaimed into force 
until January 1, 2016. For ease of reference, we will describe this as the “new Code of Civil 
Procedure.” Most of the provisions dealing with judicial disqualification in the Code that were 
in force prior to the coming into force of the new Code were enacted in 2002, and we will 
describe these as the “2002 disqualification provisions.” SQ 2002, c 7 [2002 disqualification 
provisions]. For the most part, the Code provisions dealing with judicial disqualification 
prior to 2002 were enacted in 1965, and we will describe these as the “1965 disqualification 
provisions.” SC 1965, c 80 [1965 disqualification provisions].
92. Luc Huppé, “La transformation du modèle québécois de récusation des juges” (2012) 46 
Revue juridique Thémis 209 at 212-19. See e.g. Kruger Inc v Kruco Inc, [1987] RDJ 622 (Qc 
CA) at paras 8-20, aff’g on other grounds [1987] RJQ 1071 (Qc Sup Ct). On this view of 
the law, reasonable apprehension of bias could be asserted as a ground of appeal but was not 
a basis for disqualifying a judge from hearing the case at first instance.
93. Huppé, supra note 92 at 217-219. See also 2747-3174 Québec Inc v Québec (Régie des permis 
d’alcool), [1996] 3 SCR 919 at paras 44-45, 140 DLR (4th) 577.
94. See Droit de la Famille - 1559, [1993] RJQ 625 at paras 11-12, 21-22, 101 DLR 
(4th) 345 (Qc CA).
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The Code’s 1965 disqualification provisions95 contained nine grounds for 
disqualification in section 234 and a tenth ground in section 235. Section 234 
stated that “[a] judge may be recused . . .” on any of the enumerated grounds 
whereas section 235 stated that “[a] judge is disqualified if he or his consort is 
interested in the action.”96 Five of the grounds of disqualification addressed 
situations in which the judge or a close relative had a financial or other personal 
interest in the outcome of the litigation.97 Two concerned situations where the 
judge had an association with a litigant or counsel.98 The other three concerned the 
judge’s association with the case in a non-judicial capacity,99 judicial antagonism 
towards a party,100 and judicial interest in favouring a party.101
The 1965 version of the Code also codified the procedure for recusal 
and disqualification. Judges had an affirmative obligation to make a written 
declaration of facts that might lead to their disqualification.102 If a judge chose not 
to recuse of his or her own motion, a party could make a motion for the judge’s 
disqualification within ten days of the judge’s declaration or at any other time 
provided the party was diligent in raising this possibility once the relevant facts 
came to their attention.103 If a party made a motion that the judge be disqualified, 
the judge had ten days to declare whether the facts alleged were true, and then the 
motion would be heard by a judge other than the judge whose disqualification 
was being sought.104 If the motion was upheld the judge was disqualified and a 
new judge would be assigned; if the motion was dismissed the judge was obliged 
to hear the case.105 Section 242 of the Code allowed parties to waive their right to 
have a judge disqualified, except in situations falling under the disqualification 
95. These provisions are found principally in the 1965 version of the Code. SC 1965, c 80, 
ss 234-42. There were, however, some relatively minor amendments between 1965 and 2002.
96. This version of s 235 was inserted in amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1977. 
SQ 1977, c 73, s 8 [emphasis added].
97. Ibid, ss 234(1), 234(2), 234(4), 234(7), 235.
98. Ibid, ss 234(6), 234(9).
99. Ibid, s 234(3).
100. Ibid, s 234(5).
101. Ibid, s 234(8).
102. Ibid, s 236.
103. Ibid, s 237.
104. Ibid, s 283.
105. Ibid, s 241.
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requirement of section 235 of the Code,106 but also gave judges who were subject 
to disqualification the right to recuse themselves even if the parties did not seek 
their disqualification.
In 2002, the Quebec National Assembly made two significant modifications 
to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing judicial disqualification. 
First, the grounds for disqualification were modified by adding the words “in 
particular” to the opening words of section 234 (thereby indicating that the 
enumerated list of grounds of disqualification was not exhaustive) and by adding 
to the enumerated grounds section 234(10), pursuant to which the judge may 
be disqualified “if there is reasonable cause to fear that the judge will not be 
impartial.”107 Second, and of equal importance, the procedure for determining 
whether or not a judge is disqualified was altered significantly. Section 238 was 
modified to require a motion for the judge’s disqualification to be disposed of 
by the judge responsible for hearing the case rather than by another judge.108 
This decision was made subject to appeal in accordance with the rules governing 
interlocutory appeals.109 Judges were still entitled to recuse themselves of their 
own motion, but they had to provide a written statement of the basis for doing 
so in the record and the Chief Judge or Chief Justice had to be so informed.110 
The legislation also added a provision that requires the clerk of the court to notify 
the Chief Judge or Chief Justice of any case in which the hearing is postponed 
because of a judge’s decision to recuse himself himself or herself.111
As noted above, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing 
judicial disqualification have been modified again by the coming into force on 1 
January 2016 of the new Code that was enacted by the National Assembly and 
that received Royal Assent on 20 February 2014.112 The overall thrust of the 
disqualification provisions of the new Code is to simplify the rules governing 
disqualification and make them more understandable to litigants, especially those 
who are self-represented, but there are a number of changes of substance. Section 
106. This limitation on the right of waiver is analogous to the limitations on waiver at the 
federal level in the United States. 28 USC § 455(e) permits judges to accept waiver by the 
parties of their right to disqualify the judge if the basis for disqualification is the general 
disqualification rule found in § 455(a), but not if the basis for disqualification is one of 
the grounds for automatic disqualification enumerated in § 455(b), except in unusual 
circumstances set out in § 455(f ). 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(a)-(f ).
107. 2002 disqualification provisions, supra note 91, s 47.
108. Ibid, s 50.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid, s 48 (amending s 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
111. Ibid, s 51 (replacing s 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
112. SQ 2014, c 1, ss 201-205.
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201 of the new Code is analogous to section 236 of the 2002 disqualification 
provisions. It imposes an obligation on a judge who is aware of a basis for his 
or her disqualification to make a declaration to this effect and be replaced as 
the presiding judge and an obligation on parties who become aware of a 
basis for the judge’s disqualification to make a declaration without delay. The 
significant textual difference between section 201 of the new Code and section 
236 of the 2002 disqualification provisions is that the obligations under the 
new Code are triggered by “serious reasons to question the judge’s impartiality” 
whereas under the 2002 provisions the obligations are engaged by awareness of 
a “ground of recusation.” This new terminology is repeated in section 202 of the 
new Code, which parallels section 234 of the 2002 disqualification provisions 
and identifies the bases upon which a judge may be disqualified. The opening 
words of section 202 of the new Code are: “The following situations, among 
others, may be considered serious reasons for questioning a judge’s impartiality 
and for seeking the judge’s recusation.”113 Six subsections follow, which rephrase 
and to some extent modify the grounds of disqualification found in subsections 
234(1)—234(9) of the 2002 disqualification provisions.114 Section 203 of the 
new Code mirrors section 235 of the 2002 disqualification provisions. It deals 
with situations where the judge (or the judge’s spouse) has an interest in the 
case, and it also uses the mandatory term “is disqualified” rather than a phrase 
like “may be considered a basis for disqualification.” The procedural regime for 
113. New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 202.
114. Ibid, ss 202(1)-(5); Code of Civil Procedure, ss 234(1)-(9). S 202(1) provides for 
disqualification where the judge is a spouse or close relative of one of the parties or their 
lawyer, thereby combining and slightly modifying ss 234(1) and 234(9) of the 2002 
provisions. S 202(2) replaces s 234(2) of the 2002 provisions in providing for disqualification 
where the judge is “a party to a proceeding pertaining to an issue similar to the one before 
the judge for determination.” S 202(3) rewords part of s 234(3) of the 2002 provisions and 
provides for disqualification where a judges has “given advice or an opinion on the dispute” 
or has “previously dealt with the dispute as arbitrator or mediator.” S 202(4) provides for 
disqualification on the basis of “the judge having represented one of the parties,” thereby 
replacing the aspect of s 234(3) of the 2002 provisions that provided for disqualification 
if “the judge has acted as attorney for any of the parties … .” S 202(5) provides for 
disqualification where the judge is “a shareholder or an officer of a legal person or a member 
of a partnership or an association or another group not endowed with juridical personality 
that is a party to the proceeding.” This provision modifies elements of ss 234(6) and 234(7) 
of the 2002 provisions. Finally, s 202(6) provides for disqualification on the basis of “a 
serious conflict existing between the judge and one of the parties or the lawyer of one of the 
parties, or threats or insults having been uttered between them during the proceeding or in 
the year preceding the application for recusation.” This provision modifies s 234(5) of the 
2002 provisions.
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dealing with recusal found in sections 236—241 of the 2002 disqualification 
provisions is substantially retained in sections 204 and 205 of the new Code. The 
new Code removes section 242, which addressed the issue of waiver, but a party’s 
option to waive the right to seek recusal is embedded in the text of section 201.
It is noteworthy that the new Code eliminates the ground of disqualification 
found in subsection 234(10) of the 2002 provisions (“there is reasonable cause to 
fear that the judge will not be impartial”) and instead positions “serious reasons 
for questioning a judge’s impartiality” as a general organizing principle in the 
opening words of section 202.115 While it remains to be seen how Quebec courts 
will interpret these words, in our view there is a strong likelihood that they will 
be interpreted in a manner that is very similar to the approach to the “reasonable 
apprehension of bias” test taken by courts in other Canadian provinces. As noted 
above, the new disqualification regime is presumably designed to satisfy the 
impartiality requirements of section 23 of the Quebec Charter, which are based 
on the common law standard of impartiality. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that section 202 will be interpreted in a manner that provides standards of 
disqualification that are at least as stringent as those required by the common law. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that at least some of the grounds for disqualification 
enumerated in subsections 202(1)—202(6) of the new Code appear to be 
somewhat broader than the grounds for disqualification under the common law 
as it is applied in other Canadian provinces. For example, subsection 202(4) 
treats “the judge having represented one of the parties” as a situation that “may 
be considered [a] serious [reason] for questioning a judge’s impartiality.” At 
common law, the fact that a judge had represented one of the parties might 
be the basis for finding a “reasonable apprehension of bias,” but in the absence 
of other considerations this rationale for disqualification would dissipate after 
a cooling-off period. Similarly, on its face, subsection 202(5) provides that a 
judge who is a shareholder of a corporation that is a party to a proceeding would 
be disqualified, whereas at common law there is significant authority for the 
proposition that a judge who owns shares in a publicly traded corporation that is 
a party to a proceeding is only disqualified if the outcome of the litigation could 
influence the value of the judge’s shares.116 It is possible that the use of the term 
“may” in the opening words of section 202 will give Quebec judges the flexibility 
115. Ibid, s 202.
116. See Ebner, supra note 32; Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd¸ (2011) [2010] ZACC 28, (3) SA 92, 
CCT 37/10 (S Afr Const Ct), citing Ebner, supra note 32 at paras 54-57, 67-68.
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to avoid automatic disqualification in situations falling within the scope of 
subsections 202(4) and 202(5) that would not require recusal at common law.117
V. POTENTIAL RULE-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUES IN COMMON LAW 
JURISDICTIONS
The statutory regimes for judicial disqualification in the United States, Germany, 
and Quebec all use slightly different words to express the general principle that 
judges should not hear cases in which their impartiality can reasonably be called 
into question, and they share this principle with jurisdictions that use the common 
law to govern judicial disqualification. The challenge for all these jurisdictions, 
therefore, is to define with greater precision which types of challenges to a judge’s 
impartiality the law will regard as “reasonable” and therefore acceptable and, 
correspondingly, which types of challenges will not be regarded as acceptable. 
Despite the admonition by common law courts that the application of the 
“reasonable apprehension of bias” test is fact- and context-specific, common law 
decisions have been successful at identifying a range of limitations on the types of 
challenges to a judge’s impartiality that are likely to succeed. Indeed, the English 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Locabail is best understood as a self-conscious effort 
on the part of the court to reassert the boundaries for successful challenges to the 
perception of judicial impartiality in the wake of the House of Lords decision 
in Pinochet.118 Statutory jurisdictions such as Germany, the United States, 
and, to a lesser extent, Quebec go beyond articulating a statutory standard of 
reasonable apprehension of bias to make rules about situations that do and do 
not warrant recusal.
We argue in this part of the article that there would be merit in using rules 
rather than common law decisions to establish the boundaries for successful 
challenges to judicial impartiality in a number of areas. We do not suggest that 
it would be appropriate for common law jurisdictions to simply copy the rules 
employed in the United States or Germany or even for other Canadian provinces 
117. By way of analogy, in Dufour v 99516 Canada Inc, the Quebec Court of Appeal focused on 
whether the trial judge’s relationship with one of the parties would give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias, and decided that it would not, rather than focusing on whether the 
relationship was one that strictly fell within the scope of one of the grounds enumerated 
under s 234 of the Code’s 1965 disqualification provisions. Dufour, supra note 23; 1965 
disqualification provisions, supra note 91, s 234.
118. See Kate Malleson, “Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality” (2002) 22 Legal Studies 
53 at 53-54, 62.
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to adopt the Quebec regime. Further, any rules should be specific to the court 
or administrative tribunal. As the German rules illustrate, the regulatory regime 
should be tailored to the jurisdictional scope of the court. While there are 
common themes in all the statutory regimes, there are also significant differences 
among them both at a structural level and in matters of detail. These differences, 
as well as the similarities, are instructive as we consider the role that rules might 
be able to play in supplementing common law principles governing judicial 
disqualification.
In our view, there are several reasons to believe that statutory rules will be 
helpful in supplementing the common law “reasonable apprehension of bias” 
test. The first is that, as our empirical research suggests, decisional law typically 
under-represents the instances in which judges recuse themselves, so the case law 
is likely to give at best a partial view of existing judicial practice. Second, there is 
reason to believe that informal practices concerning recusal are not particularly 
well understood by many members of the judiciary, with the result that they 
are likely to be applied inconsistently. This can cause unnecessary redistribution 
of workload among judges and potentially unnecessary delay to parties. Both 
might be alleviated if a formal set of standards were articulated in the form of 
a rule. Third, reliance on ill-understood and inconsistently applied informal 
understandings of when it is and is not appropriate for a judge to be recused 
in marginal situations can cause difficulty for parties and their counsel. The 
existence of clearer rules governing when a judge is or is not disqualified may 
prevent counsel from wasting time advancing arguments for recusal when the 
application has no reasonable chance of success and may at the same time increase 
the confidence of parties and counsel in advancing valid objections to the judge’s 
participation. Fourth, there are, at least in some circumstances, compelling 
reasons to create procedural rules that give judges the explicit authority to refer 
the decision about whether or not disqualification is required to another judge. 
Fifth, there are circumstances in which considerations of efficiency or other 
requirements of our system of adjudication enable judges to sit notwithstanding 
what appears to be an objective basis for arguing that the judge is predisposed 
in one manner or another. One example is situations where arguments are raised 
that a judge’s advocacy or writings prior to judicial appointment are indicative 
of partiality.119 In at least some of these situations it may be helpful for a judge 
to be able to point to a rule authorizing him or her to sit, rather than to have to 
explain to an objecting party that there is no reasonable basis for perceiving that 
the judge is anything but impartial. Finally, there are some situations in which 
119. See Hughes & Bryden, “Refining the Test,” supra note 16 at 180-81, 189.
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it may be useful to establish a bright-line standard for when disqualification is 
required, since the choice of any particular place to draw the line is somewhat 
arbitrary. Requiring individual judges to guess where that line ought to be 
drawn on the basis of little or no information places them in a difficult if not 
impossible situation. The best example of this type of situation is the cooling-off 
period for judges to hear cases argued by members of their former law firms or 
involving their former clients. As demonstrated by the experience of the German 
Constitutional Court and for reasons discussed in more detail below, there are 
good grounds for thinking that a cooling-off period is desirable but it is not 
obvious what the appropriate length of that cooling-off period ought to be, and 
a formal rule is both a more effective and a more transparent way of making that 
determination than an informal local practice.
As indicated at the outset of the article, we believe that there are three 
substantive areas and one procedural area in which rules would be particularly 
well-suited for giving guidance on judicial disqualification. They are: (1) 
professional relationships between justice personnel and litigation participants; 
(2) prior judicial consideration in the cause or in related litigation; (3) extrajudicial 
writings suggesting a predisposition; and (4) procedures for recusal motions. 
We will address each in turn. We refrain from offering draft rules because they 
need to be tailored to each court or tribunal, but we offer what might be thought 
of as general drafting instructions at the end of each section.
A. PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH FORMER COLLEAGUES AND 
CLIENTS
Since all Canadian judges were once lawyers,120 it is normal that they will have 
professional relationships with former clients and with former colleagues from 
their law firms. Some of these relationships may be sufficiently close that a judge 
would never feel comfortable hearing a case involving the other person—for 
example, a case argued by a former colleague who is a close personal friend or 
involving a client with whom the judge worked closely for years in his or her 
capacity as a lawyer. In addition, the Canadian jurisprudence strongly supports 
the view that if a judge was personally involved in a matter during his or her 
120. This is a common feature of judicial systems based on the English model, but it is not a 
universal feature of legal systems around the world. For example, the judicial system in 
Germany and other European countries draws its members from persons who were trained as 
adjudicators rather than from the ranks of the legal profession.
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career as a lawyer, the judge should not sit on a case that involves that matter.121 
This is not an ironclad rule since the Supreme Court of Canada has concluded 
that if the matter was sufficiently far in the past and the judge’s involvement 
sufficiently tangential that he or she has no recollection of it, it can be permissible 
for the judge to sit.122 As noted in Part I, above, the advice given to Canadian 
judges is that the judge should adopt “a ‘cooling-off’ period, often established by 
local tradition at 2, 3 or 5 years and in any event at least as long as there is any 
indebtedness between the firm and the judge” in situations where the professional 
relationship with a former colleague or client is not one that places the judge in a 
conflict of interest. In this context, conflicts of interest are confined to situations 
where the judge was personally involved with the matter in dispute, the firm was 
involved in the dispute while the judge was still a member of the firm, or close 
personal relationships were in play.123
As discussed earlier, the problem with a cooling-off period established by 
local tradition is that the tradition may not be passed on effectively to judges, 
and it is even less likely that counsel and self-represented litigants will be aware 
of the tradition. The fact that local tradition is variously described as setting 
the cooling-off period at two, three, or five years suggests that the choice of 
any particular time frame is less important than the fact that there be a shared 
understanding of what the time frame is, and this in our view lends itself to being 
established through a rule.
None of the German, Quebecois, or American federal disqualification 
rules provide for cooling-off periods, and they take quite different approaches 
to disqualification based on relationships with former clients and professional 
colleagues. Subsection 234(3) of the 2002 disqualification provisions of the 
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure identifies the fact that “the judge has acted for 
one of the parties” as a potential ground of disqualification without reference 
121. See e.g. Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 SCR 
369, 68 DLR (3d) 716; R v Catcheway, 2000 SCC 33, [2001] SCR 838; Barrett v Glynn, 
2001 NFCA 70, 207 Nfld & PEIR 213.
122. See Wewaykum, supra note 3.
123. Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 52. While the choice of any particular 
cooling-off period is somewhat arbitrary, our preference is for a period at the shorter end 
rather than the longer end of the range. In circumstances in which a judge harbours lingering 
doubts about his or her ability to be impartial in adjudicating a matter involving a former 
colleague or client, it is always open for the judge to recuse notwithstanding the fact that the 
cooling-off period has elapsed. On the other hand, a judge is not in a position to abridge the 
cooling-off period if the judge is satisfied that there is no actual basis for concern about his or 
her ability to adjudicate impartiality, since this would be inconsistent with the rationale for 
establishing the cooling-off period in the first place.
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to the passage of time and without qualifying the lawyer-client relationship 
to the matter currently before the court,124 and this approach is continued in 
subsection 202(4) of the new Code. Neither the 2002 provisions nor the new 
Code lists the relationship with members of the judge’s former law firm as an 
explicit ground of disqualification.125 While German disqualification rules 
are absolute with respect to adjudicating matters where the judge has acted 
as counsel, they are silent on whether recusal is necessary if a former client or 
colleague appears before the judge on an unrelated matter. For example, criminal 
court judges are disqualified if they have “acted in the case as an official of the 
public prosecution office, as a police officer, as attorney of the aggrieved person 
or as defence counsel.”126 Similarly, a civil court judge is barred in “all matters in 
which he was appointed as attorney of record or as a person providing assistance 
to a party, or in which he is or was authorised to make an appearance as a legal 
representative of a party.”127 By implication through omission, German judges are 
not barred from hearing cases brought by, against, or involving a former client 
in an unrelated matter at any time. As is clearly apparent from our discussion 
of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the mere fact that a German 
judge had a prior association with a law firm that is now representing a client 
before the judge is not, without more, reason for recusal. As American federal 
practice does not explicitly disqualify judges for hearing cases involving former 
clients as distinct from hearing cases in which they were personally involved in a 
non-judicial capacity, these jurisdictions offer somewhat limited guidance as to 
the precise content of a rule governing cooling-off periods.128 Similarly, American 
federal rules governing disqualification because of a judge’s association with 
124. 2002 disqualification provisions, supra note 91, s 234(3). This section also lists the 
fact that “the judge has given advice on the matter in dispute” as a potential ground of 
disqualification, which suggests that the fact that the judge has acted for one of the parties in 
the past is a ground of disqualification regardless of whether that representation took place in 
the context of the matter currently before the court.
125. Ibid, s 234(9)-(10). The relationship with lawyers is a ground of disqualification under s 
234(9) of the 2002 disqualification provisions if “the judge is the spouse of or is related or 
allied to the attorney or counsel or to the partner of any of them” but the Code makes no 
reference to former professional colleagues and this relationship would have to be assessed 
under the general ground of disqualification found in s 234(10). Section 202(1) of the new 
Code takes a similar approach to disqualification based on the judge’s relationship to a lawyer 
of one of the parties. New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 202(1).
126. StPO, supra note 59, s 22 [emphasis added].
127. German Code of Civil Procedure [ZPO], s 41(4), online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html>.
128. See e.g. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(2)-(3); StPO, supra note 59, ss 22(4)-(5); 
ibid, ss 41(4)-(6).
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a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced refer only to situations in 
which the “lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during 
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.”129 On the other hand, the 
provisions of subsection 170.1(2)(B) of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
offer a model for a two-year cooling-off period that could be adopted by rule in 
Canada or in other common law jurisdictions.
In sum, we recommend an express rule that judges may hear cases involving 
lawyers in their former law firms as long as there is no further indebtedness 
and more than two years have passed since the appointment of the judge. 
Similarly, we recommend a two-year cooling-off period for former clients in 
unrelated matters.
B. PRIOR JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH LITIGANTS
One of the areas of recusal law described by judges as raising the most difficult 
issues is what is sometimes described as the repeat customer phenomenon. 
For purposes of Canadian law, two situations need to be distinguished: 
(1) unrelated prior litigation and (2) related litigation or interlocutory matters in 
the same litigation.
As regards the first situation, in none of the jurisdictions under consideration 
is the mere fact that the judge has encountered one of the litigants in the 
course of presiding over another, unrelated matter a basis for disqualification. 
Canadian case law suggests that greater care must be taken where a judge has 
made an adverse credibility finding against a party in a previous case, but even 
in these circumstances disqualification is not required in all cases. Rather, the 
issue is whether the findings were expressed in sufficiently strong terms that a 
reasonable person would doubt the ability of the judge to adjudicate the present 
cases fairly upon the evidence adduced before him or her in a subsequent 
unrelated proceeding.
The second situation covers previous encounters with litigants in related 
litigation or other stages of the same litigation. Again, it is common ground 
among the jurisdictions under consideration that the mere fact that a judge was 
involved in some prior stage of the proceeding does not give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. Examples include breach hearings following sentencing 
129. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(2).
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with conditions, bail hearings followed by the trial on the merits, preliminary 
motions, voir dire rulings, and case-managed litigation.130
In Canada, the jurisprudence establishes that a judge may sit even if the 
judge found against a party in a prior unrelated proceeding or on an interlocutory 
issue. In our view, the basic rule that a prior encounter between judge and litigant 
does not, without more, warrant recusal could easily be codified. Its extension, 
that an adverse ruling in an interlocutory issue also does not warrant recusal, may 
be more problematic. This is because the manner in which the adverse ruling is 
expressed influences the recusal analysis. Whether judicial commentary strays 
into the forbidden zone is too contextual and nuanced to be readily captured in 
a bright-line rule.
As regards prior judicial dealings in the same or related proceedings, at least 
three distinct problems arise with some frequency. The first is the perception of 
the litigant, particularly one who is self-represented, that any prior finding of 
a judge vis-à-vis that litigant is prejudicial in terms of the ultimate outcome of 
the litigation. The second is the concern that evidence that does not form part 
of the record will contaminate the proceeding. The third is that remarks made 
by the judge in the context of fact findings or characterizations of the argument 
advanced by counsel or the litigant are seen as prejudging the matter. The first 
concern is particularly susceptible to bright-line rule making.
Efficient use of judicial resources generally suggests that a judge who is 
already familiar with the matter should be the judge dealing with it in its entirety. 
Additionally, the risk for inconsistent fact findings is reduced if only one judge 
remains seized of the matter. These reasons are sufficiently important that the 
feelings of the litigants will usually have to give way to them. Thus, the question 
is rarely whether a judge should be recused merely because he or she has been 
involved in the matter before, but how best to communicate to litigants that, 
despite their misgivings, the proper administration of justice demands that the 
judge continue to sit. One of the advantages of a rule-based approach is that 
the judge can point to the rule in explaining to the litigant, particularly the 
self-represented litigant, that recusal is not appropriate.
130. The phenomenon of judicial dispute resolution (including settlement conferencing and 
mediation) should be distinguished for these purposes from case management. In some 
jurisdictions, the rules structuring this phenomenon forbid judges who have engaged in 
dispute resolution efforts from subsequently adjudicating the matter if no settlement is 
reached. See e.g. British Columbia Supreme Court Family Rules, BC Reg 169/2009, ss 7-1(17), 
7-2(3); New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 165. Other jurisdictions permit the 
judge to continue and adjudicate the case, but only with the agreement of the judge and all 
of the parties. (See, e.g. Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, s 4.21.)
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In all three jurisdictions we have examined, the sole blanket exception to the 
general rule that a judge may sit in cases despite prior judicial involvement is the 
participation of a judge in an appellate consideration of his or her own decision. 
In the German context, the specific mention of this exception makes clear that 
other forms of prior judicial involvement do not attract disqualification. The 
equivalent limitation is also codified at the federal level in the United States131 and 
in a number of Canadian jurisdictions.132 Nevertheless, the leading United States 
Supreme Court decision on the question of whether prior judicial involvement in 
a case attracts disqualification, Liteky v United States,133 does not rely on this fact 
as a reason for permitting judges to sit in cases of prior judicial involvement other 
than one’s own appeal, and we are not aware of any Canadian case that relies on 
comparable Canadian statutes in support of this proposition. This may suggest 
that the place of codification is important for its interpretation. In Germany, 
the bar against considering one’s own decision at the appellate level is included 
in the general rules surrounding disqualification. In Canada, the same rules are 
dispersed through, inter alia, rules of court, the Criminal Code, and various 
enabling statutes establishing appellate courts. Section 551.1 of the Criminal 
Code provides that “the appointment of a judge as the case management judge 
does not prevent him or her from becoming the judge who hears the evidence on 
the merits,” while section 551.4 provides for the procedure to be applied when 
the case management judge is also the trial judge. This recent amendment to the 
Criminal Code is a good example of how Canadian statute law already includes 
some rules that clarify the circumstances when a judge does not need to recuse.134 
Similarly, British Columbia’s family court rules allow the case management judge 
to remain seized of further applications in the cause but preclude the settlement 
conference judge from presiding over the trial.135
In short, we recommend enactment of an express rule that prior judicial 
involvement with a litigant is not, without more, a basis for recusal regardless of 
whether the litigation is related or not.
131. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 47. The section reads, “No judge shall hear or determine an appeal 
from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”
132. See e.g. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 28(1); New Brunswick Judicature Act, RSNB 
1973, c J-2, s 8(7); Alberta Court of Appeal Act, RSA, c C-30, s 11.
133. (1994) 510 US 540, 114 S Ct 1147.
134. SC 2011, c 16, s 4.
135. British Columbia Supreme Court Family Rules, supra note 130. S 165 of the new Code of 
Civil Procedure also indicates that a judge who presides over a settlement conference can take 
appropriate case management measures but may not “subsequently try the case or decide any 
incidental application.” New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 165.
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C. EXTRAJUDICIAL WRITINGS
Canadian courts have generally been reluctant to disqualify judges simply 
because of their extrajudicial writings, be they related to advocacy, advice to 
government, political activity, or academic commentary. A prominent example 
of this reluctance is the decision of Justice Bastarache of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Arsenault-Cameron.136 The case involved minority language rights 
and Justice Bastarache had written extensively on the issue when he was a law 
professor. He had also been counsel for minority language rights groups prior 
to his appointment to the bench. When the Prince Edward Island case came to 
the Court, counsel for the province brought a motion for his recusal. The Court 
took the opportunity to clarify the procedure appropriate for recusal and denied 
the motion. The decision is not only in line with Canadian jurisprudence but 
also with the practice of comparator courts of last resort.137 It is nevertheless 
easy to see why counsel might have been concerned. As in the situation of the 
self-represented litigant re-encountering a judge, the issue is not so much whether 
recusal is appropriate but how to communicate that the judge should continue 
to sit. One of the animating reasons for adopting a “reasonable apprehension 
of bias” test in preference over requiring proof of actual bias is that both the 
presence and the absence of an open mind are difficult to prove. There is a reason 
why the issue arises most commonly in appellate and constitutional courts. These 
courts have tended to recruit more routinely from the professoriate than do the 
trial courts, although recent Canadian experience seems to suggest an increased 
trend towards appointing law professors to provincial courts.138
In all of these cases, then, there is reason to consider whether bright-line 
rules might be better suited to promote confidence in the justice system and give 
136. Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 SCR 851, 201 Nfld & PEIR 1; 
Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1, [2000] 1 SCR 3.
137. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court confirmed that in addition to extrajudicial writing, 
judicial involvement in community organizations does not generally give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney 
General), 2015 SCC 25 at para 62, [2015] 2 SCR 282.
138. It is interesting to note that in an article entitled “Some Problems with Extrajudicial 
Writing,” Susan Bartie and John Gava argue that judges should not engage in scholarly 
writing on legal topics after they have been appointed to the bench out of a concern that 
such writings will give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge has predetermined 
legal issues that may arise in a case that comes before the judge for adjudication. “Some 
Problems with Extrajudicial Writing” (2012) 34 Sydney L Rev 637. Bartie and Gava draw 
a distinction between scholarly writing that takes place before the judge’s appointment, 
which should not reasonably be treated as giving rise to a basis for disqualification, and the 
extrajudicial writings of sitting judges (ibid at 653-54).
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comfort to litigants, or at least avoid unnecessary and ultimately unsuccessful 
recusal motions. Inspiration might be taken from the German Constitutional 
Court, despite the fact that the institutional practices of that court are greatly at 
variance with the Canadian situation. As discussed in Part III, above, judges are 
appointed to the court for a single tenure of twelve years, they overwhelmingly 
come from the legal academy, and they routinely continue to participate in 
academic conferences and publications throughout their judicial tenure. Given 
that institutional design, it is foreseeable that the situation in Arsenault-Cameron 
would occur with much higher frequency in that court absent a statutory rule to 
the contrary. The Constitutional Court Act therefore usefully provides that neither 
advice to government, nor involvement in the drafting process of legislation, nor 
academic writing gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
We recommend that rules of court provide that neither writing nor speech 
making prior to judicial appointment disqualify a judge, even if he or she 
advocates a position on a contentious issue. We note that this would not relieve 
judges of the obligation to consider whether they are able to approach with an 
open mind an issue they have spoken or written about.
D. PROCEDURAL RULES
In most parts of Canada, there is no special procedure by which parties may seek 
the disqualification of a judge.139 It is common for judges to recuse themselves 
of their own motion if they believe that they are disqualified, and our research 
suggests that this is the most common procedural context in which recusal 
decisions are made.140 If a party wishes to seek a judge’s recusal, the normal 
practice is for a party to make a motion using the ordinary rules of motion 
practice.141 It is also relatively common for judges who are unsure about whether 
or not they should recuse themselves to seek submissions from the parties.142 
139. As noted above, Quebec is exceptional in this respect.
140. See Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg,” supra note 4 at 576-77.
141. See Bryden, “Legal Principles,” supra note 6 at 590-94. Geoffrey Lester has suggested that 
a preferable practice would be for counsel to make an informal application from the bar 
table with appropriate supporting materials, but he acknowledges that the use of a motion 
is the common practice. Geoffrey Lester, “Disqualifying Judges for Bias and Reasonable 
Apprehension of Bias: Some Problems of Practice and Procedure” (2001) 24 Advocates 
Q 326 at 342-46.
142. See e.g., Lambert, supra note 47. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal has advised that, 
in these situations, the proper practice is for the judge to seek submissions and render the 
decision personally rather than to seek a waiver from the parties or indicate that the judge 
will automatically recuse if the party raises an objection.
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While this procedure works tolerably well, it does present certain difficulties that 
could be addressed through the use of procedural rules.
The first difficulty concerns the fact that the judge whose impartiality 
is being questioned makes the decision about whether or not he or she is 
disqualified. There are a number of practical reasons why it may be desirable in 
some circumstances to have the judge whose disqualification is at issue make the 
determination, at least at first instance. One is that the judge is in the best position 
to know subjectively if there is a real basis for concern about his or her ability 
to decide impartially, and in those situations the judge ought to be in a position 
to decide that it is inappropriate for him or her to sit.143 A second reason is 
that automatically referring the matter to another judge might encourage parties 
to make unmeritorious applications for tactical reasons, for example to create 
delay. A third is that there are situations in which the basis for disqualification 
arises unexpectedly, for example if a judge recognizes a social relationship with 
a witness when the witness first appears in court partway through a lengthy 
hearing. Referral in these circumstances may cause delay that is not in the best 
interests of either party. As we indicated in Part IV, above, prior to 2002 sections 
238—41 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure required applications for recusal 
to be heard by a different judge than the judge whose recusal was being sought, 
but when the National Assembly amended the rules governing recusal in 2002, 
it established a procedural regime in which motions for recusal are heard by the 
judge seized of the case.144
143. This view is consistent with the conclusions of Canadian Judicial Council in its report of 
a complaint concerning the recusal of Justice Jean-Guy Boilard in the midst of a long and 
complicated criminal trial after he received a letter from the Canadian Judicial Council 
criticizing his treatment of one of the lawyers in a related case. The Council observed that it 
is the individual responsibility of every judge to determine whether there are circumstances 
that prevent him or her from continuing to hear a case, and in the absence of evidence of 
bad faith, there is no basis for criticism of that decision. Canadian Judicial Council, Report 
of the Canadian Judicial Council to the Minister of Justice of Canada under s. 65(1) of the 
Judges Act concerning Mr. Justice Jean-Guy Boilard of the Superior Court of Quebec (Ottawa: 
Canadian Judicial Council, 2003) at 3-4, online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/
conduct_inq_boilard_ReportIC_200312_en.pdf>.
144. SQ 2007, c 7, ss 48-51. Huppé has observed that this procedural change was based on a 
recommendation of the Comité de Révision de la Procédure Civile in order to avoid improper 
interference with judicial independence. Huppé, supra note 92 at 227-34. Huppé argues, 
in our view correctly, that the protection of judicial independence does not require that a 
judge who is the subject of a motion seeking his or her disqualification be obliged to decide 
the motion personally. In our view, there are practical reasons why it is appropriate for 
the judge to be empowered to do so, but this should not prevent the creation of rules that 
empower the judge to transfer the motion to another judge for adjudication.
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At the same time, many commentators,145 including some judges,146 have 
noted the awkwardness of asking the judge whose impartiality is called into 
question to adjudicate this issue. This awkwardness is particularly apparent where 
the challenge to the judge’s impartiality is based on things the judge has said or 
done, either during the course of the hearing or outside of it, that give rise to a 
concern on the part of a party that the judge is not capable of deciding the case 
impartially. In our view, it would be helpful to give judges the explicit authority 
to refer the matter to another judge, especially in such circumstances. We are 
mindful of the advantages of regimes that require all recusal motions to be heard 
by someone other than the judge whose recusal is sought, at least if the judge does 
not recuse himself or herself right away on receiving the motion, but it seems to 
us that in most situations, the reasons described above for having the judge whose 
recusal is sought make the determination are persuasive. Giving the judge who is 
the subject of the recusal application the discretion to refer the matter to another 
judge should be sufficient to capture those instances where the interests of justice 
would be better served by having another judge make the decision.
The other procedural issue that has raised some difficulties in Canada is the 
question of who makes the decision on an application to disqualify one member 
of a multi-member panel. While there has been some unevenness in Canadian 
practice over time,147 the current view is that the judge whose recusal is sought 
makes the decision.148 The more difficult question is whether this decision is 
subject to review by the other members of the panel, and, if not, what steps the 
other members of the panel should take if they disagree with the other judge’s 
decision not to recuse. In SOS-Save Our St. Clair Inc. v Toronto (City),149 the 
majority of the panel decided that, based on their concerns regarding the decision 
of the third member of the panel not to recuse himself, they would withdraw, 
thereby requiring the constitution of a new panel to hear the matter in dispute. 
While this type of unfortunate situation is unlikely to arise very often, it seems 
145. See e.g. Bassett & Perschbacher, “Elusive Goal”, supra note 29 at 203-207, 213-14; Amanda 
Frost, “Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal” 
(2004-2005) 53 U Kan L Rev 531 at 571-72, 583-87.
146. See Ebner, supra note 32 at paras 74 (per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ), 185 
(per Callinan J); Sir Anthony Mason, “Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias 
and the Problem of Appellate Review” (1998) 1 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 21.
147. See Bryden, “Legal Principles,” supra note 6 at 594-95.
148. See SOS-Save Our St Clair Inc v Toronto (City) (2005), 78 OR (3d) 331at paras 19-20, 
115-18, 261 DLR (4th) 727 (Ont Div Ct) (per Greer, E. Macdonald & Matlow JJ) 
[SOS-Save Our St Clair Inc]; c.f. CEP, Local 60N v Abitibi Consolidated Inc, 2008 NLCA 4 at 
para 35, 273 Nfld & PEIR 17.
149.  SOS-Save Our St Clair Inc, ibid at 148.
HUGHES, BRYDEN,  FROM PRINCIPLES TO RULES 895
to us that it would be preferable to have procedural rules that would give both 
judges and parties guidance on how to address recusal applications when dealing 
with multi-member panels.
One possibility would be to maintain the current practice that would require 
the judge whose recusal is being sought to make the decision but add a right of 
review of that decision by the other members of the panel. A second possibility, 
which would be our preferred option, is to make a rule that the recusal of any 
panel member must be addressed by the entire panel.150 A third possibility would 
be to adopt the German practice of having all of the members of the panel except 
the judge whose recusal is being sought hear the motion.151 We prefer the option 
of a rule that the whole panel hear the matter because it enables the parties to have 
the benefit of the views of the entire panel on what is, in essence, a legal question. 
Presumably if the judge in question is uncomfortable about being involved in 
the decision it would be open to him or her to recuse himself or herself on the 
motion and let the other members of the panel decide, but as we have suggested 
above, in most situations there are reasons why it is appropriate that the judge 
whose recusal is being sought have an opportunity to participate in the decision, 
even if that judge does not have the final say in the matter.
In our view, express procedural rules included in the rules of court would 
be preferable to the current ad hoc approach. Reasonable arguments can be 
made for a variety of approaches, as the comparator jurisdictions illustrate. Our 
recommendation is to grant judges the express power to refer a recusal motion. 
For multi-member panels, we recommend that the panel, not only the judge with 
respect to whom a reasonable apprehension of bias is alleged, should entertain 
the motion. The judge should have the right to recuse himself or herself from the 
decision on the motion.
150. This approach was adopted in admittedly unusual circumstances by the South African 
Constitutional Court. See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby 
Football Union [1999] ZACC 9, 1999 (4) SA 147 (S Afr Const Ct). In that case, the 
applicants sought the recusal of five of the ten members of the Court, and further allegations 
and complaints were made about all of the members of the Court. With the agreement of 
counsel, the entire Court heard the motion for recusal.
151. This is the approach used by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Siemer v Heron. Siemer v 
Heron, [2011] NZSC 116, [2012] 1 NZLR 293. The applicant sought an order that two 
members of the Court not sit on the case on the basis of an apparent bias against him, and 
the other three members of the Court heard and dismissed the application.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are good reasons why the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test is 
context-specific and why it may not be possible to supplant it completely with 
a comprehensive set of rules governing judicial disqualification. Nevertheless, 
the experience in comparator jurisdictions suggests that there may be a place 
for recusal rules in some circumstances. The animating reasons for urging a 
(modest) resort to a rule-based approach are grounded in efficiency, legitimacy, 
and access to justice.
The current case-based approach serves Canadian law well in novel situations 
and in cases where only a fulsome review and careful weighing of all the facts 
permits a determination whether a judge should recuse. However, many situations 
inviting bias considerations are commonplace. Empirical research has shown that 
resort to case law in these situations can be problematic because the jurisprudence 
does not compel a particular outcome and because the jurisprudence is slanted 
towards explaining why a judge should sit while most decisions to recuse are 
invisible. Even in situations where the jurisprudence is clear, the outcome is often 
difficult to communicate credibly to litigants. This problem is aggravated for 
self-represented litigants.
In this article, we have identified four situations where it would be productive 
to employ rules to clarify some marginal situations in which it is difficult to 
determine when it is, and is not, appropriate for judges to sit. We think rules 
would be of benefit to judges and the parties appearing before them in relation 
to professional relationships with former colleagues and clients, prior judicial 
involvement with litigants, extrajudicial writings, and procedures governing 
motions for recusal.
Clarifying the rules surrounding professional relationships and prior judicial 
involvement, and rendering them visible to counsel and self-represented litigants, 
would make recusal decisions more efficient, avoid unnecessary delays, and tend 
to legitimate recusal decisions in the eyes of litigants. The law on extrajudicial 
writings in Canada is clear enough, but judges still find themselves having to 
explain why they should sit despite having written on an issue now before the 
court. This is unnecessarily stressful for all participants. A rule codifying the 
existing law would be helpful. Finally, the Canadian literature and the literature 
in the comparator jurisdictions confirm that the question of who should decide 
recusal is the source of considerable anxiety for judges and litigants alike. The 
Canadian rule that the judge whose recusal is sought should decide is sound in 
most circumstances. However, there are cases where a fresh set of eyes would 
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give comfort to litigants, counsel, and judges. Granting judges the power to refer 
the decision would allow for a case-by-case weighing of concerns for efficiency 
and legitimacy.
We do not exclude the possibility that there may be other areas in which 
rules would be helpful, but it seems to us that in an area where constitutional 
considerations lie very close to the surface it may be appropriate to begin with 
a relatively conservative approach to the use of rules to clarify the boundaries of 
judicial disqualification.
